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n response to the progress of North Korea toward a functional submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the growing maritime assertiveness of 
China, South Korea has expressed a strong interest in acquiring a fleet of nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSNs)�1 The United States now faces a difficult 
debate: it must choose whether it will oppose or support the Republic of Korea’s 
emerging SSN program� This article contributes to this debate, discussing how a 
Republic of Korea (ROK) SSN program could result in strategic risks or benefits, 
or both, for the United States� The risks of such a policy are readily apparent� 
First, the project might undermine already-fragile Sino-allied and ROK-Japan 
relations, damaging regional stability� Second, it might create nonproliferation 
concerns by expanding the ROK’s latent nuclear capabilities� Third, an ROK SSN 
program would involve major opportunity costs; the resources necessary to fund 
it inevitably would siphon ROK resources away from investments in other crucial 
capabilities�2
Despite these significant risks, however, this 
article argues that the United States should sup-
port and assist its ally if South Korea pursues ac-
quisition of SSNs� First, if the United States works 
with South Korea, it will have a greater ability to 
ameliorate the aforementioned risks that the pro-
gram poses� Second, U�S� assistance would bolster 
intra-alliance cohesion by reinforcing U�S� com-
mitment and allowing South Korea to bear more of 
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the burden for allied security� Third, support for ROK SSNs would improve the 
coercive diplomacy of the United States toward North Korea by enhancing allied 
capabilities and signaling allied resolve� Fourth, an SSN fleet would strengthen 
the ROK’s power-projection capabilities, improving the allies’ ability to cooperate 
on security contingencies beyond the peninsula�
ALLIED REGIONAL INTERESTS
Any discussion of the strategic implications of ROK SSNs for the United States 
must begin with an overview of the allies’ shared interests in the Indo-Pacific� 
First, the United States and South Korea have an interest in preserving their na-
tional security against military aggression� The allies seek to maintain a strong 
deterrent and defense against potential aggressors—most notably North Korea� 
They aim to dissuade challengers from direct attacks, as well as less-conventional 
aggression such as hybrid warfare and state-sponsored terrorism� They also en-
deavor to remain prepared to defeat aggression should deterrence fail�
Second, the allies are committed to preserving the economic growth and pros-
perity that has allowed their respective nations to flourish�3 Both recognize that 
this prosperity is dependent on the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, 
which in turn depends on the alliance’s ability to deter North Korea� The allies 
also appreciate that their continued economic vitality hinges on regional stability 
more broadly; instability in the Indo-Pacific undoubtedly would undercut the 
economic interests of both allies� In particular, the ROK economy depends on 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that run through the South and East China 
Seas� If these SLOCs were threatened or interdicted the prosperity of South 
Korea would suffer significantly� Regional security and stability are undergirded 
by the existing rules-based international order, which provides for freedom of the 
seas and the peaceful resolution of international disputes� This order, in turn, is 
underpinned by the U�S� hub-and-spoke alliances in the Indo-Pacific, including 
the vital U�S�-ROK alliance�
Third, the allies share common values�4 Both understand the importance of 
democratic governance and human rights� Similarly, the allies are committed 
to the rule of law, both domestically and internationally� This provides both 
allies with an additional incentive to resist the aggressive designs of the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the Korean Peninsula, defending 
the ROK’s successful democracy against the authoritarian regime in the north�
These allied interests face significant challenges in the Indo-Pacific� First, the 
DPRK’s accelerating nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic-missile (ICBM), 
and SLBM programs pose a major threat�5 These capabilities greatly increase the 
destructive potential of a peninsular war for both South Korea and the United 
States� If North Korea is able to use these capabilities to establish a secure nuclear 
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deterrent, it also might become emboldened, undercutting the allied ability to 
deter DPRK aggression short of war�6 These capabilities also make it far more 
difficult for the allies to defend against North Korea, should deterrence fail�
Although the allies have taken steps to offset the DPRK’s ICBM threat, such as 
strengthening the ROK’s Korea Air and Missile Defense systems and deploying 
terminal high-altitude area-defense (THAAD) batteries, the DPRK’s develop-
ment of diesel-electric ballistic-missile submarines (SSBs) and SLBMs threatens 
to circumvent these measures�7 North Korea already has tested a Pukkuksong-I 
SLBM fired from a Sinpo-B-class SSB successfully and is developing new, more-
capable versions of both the Pukkuksong and Sinpo� Estimates suggest that 
North Korea will be able to field the Pukkuksong by 2020�8 Once deployed, these 
systems will complicate significantly the allies’ ability to prosecute their “4D” 
operational concept: detecting, disrupting, destroying, and defending against the 
DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities�9
The growing maritime assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
poses an additional, major obstacle to both allies’ security and economic in-
terests� China claims special privileges outside its territorial seas, both in its 
exclusive economic zone and within its nine-dash line in the South China Sea� 
These claims contradict the principle of freedom of the seas�10 China has become 
increasingly forceful and provocative in asserting these claims, harassing USS 
Decatur in the midst of its freedom-of-navigation exercise near the Spratly Is-
lands on 30 September 2018�11 Furthermore, China steadily has militarized the 
South China Sea, developing a host of new military facilities throughout this im-
portant waterway�12 Simultaneously, China has expanded its regional antiaccess/ 
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, strengthening its ability to hold maritime traf-
fic at risk�13 These developments could threaten regional stability, the security of 
key SLOCs, and the rules-based international order�
Furthermore, the integrity of the U�S�-ROK alliance itself faces challenges 
rooted in uncertainty and ROK fears of abandonment� The rhetoric that can-
didate Donald J� Trump used on the campaign trail in 2016 subsequently cre-
ated significant concern in South Korea over whether President Trump and the 
United States would maintain a strong commitment to the alliance� Subsequent 
questions over host-nation support, the funding of THAAD, and U�S� trade pres-
sure only have compounded these concerns�14 Finally, the unilateral decision to 
cancel major U�S�-ROK military exercises as part of Washington’s efforts to ne-
gotiate denuclearization with Pyongyang has caused substantial alarm in Seoul�
SUBMARINE PROPULSION: AN OVERVIEW
Modern conventional attack submarines (SSKs) rely on diesel-electric propul-
sion systems rather than nuclear power� SSK propellers are driven via an electric 
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battery, which in turn is connected to and charged by a diesel engine� These 
propulsion systems depend on regular refueling for the diesel generator, which 
limits SSKs’ range� The system also prevents SSKs from remaining submerged 
for extended periods; SSKs must “snorkel” regularly at periscope depth to run 
their diesel engines to recharge their batteries� This feature limits their endur-
ance and renders them vulnerable and easy to detect�15 The recent introduction of 
air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems to augment the diesel-electric system 
has improved the undersea endurance of SSKs, but even the most advanced SSKs 
must snorkel to recharge at least once every few weeks�16
Nuclear submarines, in contrast, are propelled by onboard nuclear reactors� 
These reactors use enriched uranium to provide the power needed to drive the 
submarines’ propellers� This system gives SSNs and nuclear-powered ballistic- 
missile submarines (SSBNs) virtually unlimited range and endurance, allowing 
them to remain at sea or underwater almost indefinitely; neither diesel fuel 
nor air are required to propel these boats� The only limitation on the range and 
endurance of an SSN is food for the crew�17 Nuclear reactors also generate more 
power, supporting a faster and larger boat capable of carrying more extensive 
weaponry and sensors�18 This added endurance, range, speed, and equipment 
comes at a price, however� SSNs are noisier and less maneuverable than many 
modern SSKs� The reactors also require enriched uranium as fuel, creating prolif-
eration concerns� Indeed, many SSNs use highly enriched uranium (HEU), which 
is over 20 percent uranium-235 (U-235) and can be used to provide the fissile 
material for a nuclear weapon�
Development and subsequent operation of the SSN are technologically chal-
lenging and financially costly endeavors that only a few maritime powers have 
mastered� Presently, the United States, Russia, China, France, the United King-
dom, and India are the only states that operate SSNs� Brazil also is developing 
its own SSN, with assistance from France�19 The significant technological and 
financial hurdles to acquiring an SSN suggest that the club of states operating 
these boats will remain relatively small for the foreseeable future�
The United States fields a sizable fleet of SSNs; indeed, the U�S� submarine 
fleet is exclusively nuclear powered� The Submarine Force Pacific under U�S� 
Pacific Fleet operates thirty-one SSNs�20 As highlighted in table 1, these comprise 
twenty-four of the older but formidable Los Angeles–class SSNs and seven of the 
newer and more powerful Virginia- and Seawolf-class SSNs� They are based in 
Guam, in Hawaii, and along the West Coast�
North Korea possesses a range of diesel-powered submarines (see table 1)� 
While many of these SSKs are antiquated and small, they can be used to lethal 
effect, as was demonstrated in 2010 with the sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan. 
While North Korea has taken steps to develop diesel-powered SSBs capable of 
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launching nuclear missiles, it has not made any noticeable progress toward a 
nuclear-powered submarine�
During the Cold War, South Korea primarily fielded “midget submarines”; 
the Korean attack submarine (KSS) program began the process of modernizing 
the submarine fleet in 1989�21 As displayed in table 1, South Korea currently pos-
sesses only conventional diesel-electric SSKs� It operates nine Type 209 (Chang 
Bogo–class, KSS-1) and nine Type 214 (Son Won-il–class, KSS-2) SSKs� It also is 
developing nine new three-thousand-ton SSX indigenous (Jangbogo III–class, 
KSS-3) diesel-electric submarines, the first of which deployed in 2018�
ROK president Moon Jae-in repeatedly has expressed an interest in developing 
SSNs�22 Many current and former ROK government and military officials claim 
that ROK SSNs would dramatically improve the ROK’s ability to both deter and 
defeat the DPRK’s emerging SLBM capability and to secure the maritime com-
mons� In the past the United States has been unwilling to transfer the sensitive 
technology necessary for nuclear naval propulsion to South Korea, but the Moon 
administration’s renewed interest in this technology should spark a new debate 
in the United States on the merits of assisting South Korea in developing its own 
SSNs�23 
THE RISKS POSED BY AN ROK SSN PROGRAM
Sino-Allied Relations
An ROK SSN program could create a number of significant strategic challenges 
for the United States� First and foremost, it might damage already fragile Sino-
allied relations� The logic of the security dilemma suggests that if South Korea 
DPRK Submarines PRC Submarines ROK Submarines USINDOPACOM  Submarines
10 Yugo class (midget sub) 12 Song class (SSK) 9 Chang Bogo class (SSK) 24 Los Angeles class (SSN)
 5 Yono class (midget sub) 13 Yuan class (SSK) 9 Son Won-il class (SSK)   4 Virginia class (SSN)
40 Sang-o class (SSK) 12 Kilo class (SSK) 1 Jangbogo III class SSK/
SSX (8 more planned)
  3 Seawolf class (SSN)
20 Romeo class (SSK) 13 Ming class (SSK)
  2 Sinpo class (SSB)   3 Han class (SSN)
  2 Shang I class (SSN)
  4 Shang II class (SSN)
TABLE 1
REGIONAL SSKs, SSXs, SSNs, AND SSBs
Notes: DPRK = Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; PRC = People’s Republic of China; ROK = Republic of Korea; SSB = diesel-electric ballistic-missile 
submarine; SSK = conventional attack submarine; SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine; USINDOPACOM = U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
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strengthens its military capabilities, even for defensive purposes, nearby states 
such as China may see these improvements as designed to undermine their se-
curity�24 Furthermore, China increasingly views the U�S� alliance system in the 
Indo-Pacific in adversarial terms and has responded poorly to previous advances 
in allied military capabilities�25 China likely would see an ROK SSN fleet as part 
of a broader effort by the United States and its allies to contain growing Chi-
nese power� Worse still, it might interpret this program as a deliberate attempt 
to degrade the PRC’s second-strike nuclear capability� China fields a relatively 
small—and therefore vulnerable—nuclear arsenal and its SSBNs are not particu-
larly capable or stealthy�26 In theory, new ROK SSNs in the region could be used 
in conjunction with U�S� capabilities to hold PRC SSBNs at risk�
Tensions between the allies and China are mounting already� In 2018, the 
United States disinvited China from the annual Rim of the Pacific naval exer-
cises, employed sanctions against the PRC’s agency for military procurement for 
purchasing Russian weaponry, and imposed several significant tariffs on PRC 
exports�27 China, meanwhile, refused to allow a USN vessel to dock in Hong 
Kong, canceled several high-level military talks with U�S� officials, and amplified 
its challenges to U�S� freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea�28 
ROK-PRC ties also have been on the decline following a significant diplomatic 
spat over the ROK’s purchase of THAAD batteries in 2016 and 2017� An ROK 
SSN program might only compound further the growing hostility between the 
allies and China�
Growing Sino-allied tensions could create several challenges� First, it could 
lead China to expand and enhance its undersea arsenal further�29 This could trig-
ger an unnecessary arms competition and spiraling tensions that would destabi-
lize the region and leave all parties worse off�30 The character of SSNs may make 
them particularly apt to provoke arms races� A number of strategic theorists 
have pointed out that offensive capabilities—those assets that are uniquely well 
suited for offensive operations—are the most likely to create insecurity among 
neighboring states�31 SSNs’ virtually unlimited range greatly enhances the deploy-
ing states’ ability to project power, and their stealth and endurance make them 
difficult to defend against; this makes SSNs particularly effective for offensive 
naval operations�
History is replete with examples of problematic naval arms races� The German 
decision to acquire a large fleet in the early twentieth century triggered a major 
naval arms race with the United Kingdom in the lead-up to World War I�32 The 
U�K� decision to develop a dreadnought—a large, advanced warship with only 
heavy guns—acted as a critical catalyst for the escalation of this arms race; not 
long after Britain introduced this platform, the Anglo-German arms race intensi-
fied further, with both sides acquiring many new capital ships�33 Around the same 
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time, Brazil’s purchase of several British dreadnoughts touched off a local arms 
race with the Argentine and Chilean navies�
The Indo-Pacific itself already may be in the midst of a nascent submarine 
arms race, with various regional countries acquiring new attack submarines� In 
the aftermath of the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, China rapidly began acquiring 
a larger fleet of SSNs as part of an A2/AD approach to challenge U�S� ability to 
operate in the region�34 These acquisitions and fear of Chinese intentions in turn 
provoked a broader regional undersea race, with a number of states enhancing 
their undersea capabilities qualitatively, quantitatively, or both�35 These steps 
raised tensions further, and inspired additional states to seek their own SSKs, of-
ten from China�36 As table 2 demonstrates, states across the region are acquiring 
more-powerful undersea fleets� Singapore’s defense ministry recently highlighted 
that the number of submarines in the western Pacific may rise from 200 to 250 
by 2025�37 
Setbacks in Sino-allied relations could create other challenges� Rather than 
developing new antisubmarine warfare (ASW) or sub-
surface capabilities, China might retaliate with economic 
coercion against South Korea� The PRC’s recent reaction 
to U�S�-ROK cooperation on THAAD is illustrative of this 
risk� China accused the allies of developing capabilities that 
would threaten strategic stability by undermining the PRC’s 
second-strike capability� Following the ROK’s decision to 
acquire the system, China issued a formal diplomatic pro-
test and suspended high-level security dialogues� It also de-
ployed its own long-range radar systems to Inner Mongolia 
in a thinly veiled tit-for-tat maneuver�38 Just as problem-
atically, China initiated a campaign of economic coercion 
targeting South Korea� Korean pop music events in China 
were canceled, several Korean television shows were taken 
off the air, and PRC regulators cut off Korean video game 
manufacturers from the Chinese market�39 China also pro-
hibited travel agencies from offering package tours to South 
Korea, which cut Chinese tourism to South Korea by 20 
percent�40 The Korean firm Lotte was targeted by PRC gov-
ernment investigations, and the bulk of its stores in China 
were shut down “for safety violations�”41 Given the potential 
for China to see ROK SSNs as a threat to its SSBNs, it is pos-
sible that China might respond in a similar fashion should 
South Korea develop this capability�
Planned and Recently Completed  
SSK Acquisitions in the Indo-Pacific
India 24
Taiwan  8
Australia  6
Vietnam  6
Indonesia  5
Thailand  3
Singapore  2
Bangladesh  2
Philippines  2
Note: SSK = conventional attack submarine.
Sources: Groll and De Luce, “China Is Fueling a 
Submarine Arms Race”; ”Thailand Approves $393-
Mln Purchase of Chinese Submarines,” Reuters, 
24 April 2017, in.reuters.com/; Ridzwan Rahmat, 
“TKMS Begins Work on Singapore’s Third and 
Fourth Type 218SG Submarines,” Jane’s 360, 16 
January 2018, www.janes.com/; Marhalim Abas, 
“Fighters, Submarines on Philippines Shopping 
List,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 22 June 
2018, aviationweek.com/; “Bangladesh’s First 2 
Submarines Commissioned,” Daily Star, 12 March 
2017, www.thedailystar.net/; Franz-Stefan Gady, 
“Taiwan’s Indigenous Submarine to Be Based on 
European Design,” The Diplomat, 26 September 
2018, thediplomat.com/.
TABLE 2
AN INDO-PACIFIC UNDERSEA  
ARMS RACE?
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China also might respond to this system by threatening key U�S� interests 
across the Indo-Pacific� For instance, it could relax further its implementation 
of sanctions against North Korea� This would undercut U�S� (and ROK) attempts 
to compel North Korea to denuclearize� Alternatively, China might intensify its 
militarization of the South China Sea� It could ramp up its interference with U�S� 
freedom-of-navigation operations and surveillance flights and deploy new ca-
pabilities to its expanding network of military facilities throughout the disputed 
waterway� This would undercut the allies’ efforts to maintain free and open ac-
cess to the South China Sea�
U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Cooperation
An ROK SSN program also might threaten delicate ROK-Japan ties, undercutting 
recent U�S�-led trilateral cooperation� Relations between Japan and South Korea 
have been beset by numerous challenges, including a territorial dispute over the 
Liancourt Rocks (known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan) and con-
tention related to Japan’s imperial history�42 Given these tensions, Japan might see 
an ROK SSN program as a threat to its own maritime security� In particular, Japan 
could grow concerned that South Korea might deploy its SSNs to assert control 
more actively over the Liancourt Rocks�
ROK-Japan relations already are relatively poor� Despite a recent bilateral 
agreement between Japan and South Korea over compensations for former “com-
fort women” in Korea—women who were forced into sexual slavery for the Im-
perial Japanese Army during the Second World War—this issue has continued 
to disrupt positive relations between the two states�43 Similarly, South Korea and 
Japan have become locked in a dispute over whether Japanese firms should be 
compelled to provide compensation for forced labor during the country’s colo-
nial rule over Korea�44 Overall, the publics in both countries have largely nega-
tive perceptions of one another; a Genron-NPO survey found that 48�6 percent 
of Japanese and 56�1 percent of South Koreans had negative impressions of the 
other state in 2017�45 Japanese fears over an ROK SSN program might serve to 
exacerbate bilateral tensions further�
Damaged relations between South Korea and Japan could undercut the signifi-
cant U�S� interest in stronger U�S�-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation� The United 
States long has sought to strengthen coordination between its two most impor-
tant allies in the Indo-Pacific despite their historical animosity� Trilateral coor-
dination improves the allies’ ability to pursue key common objectives, including 
protecting shared SLOCs and the maritime commons, confronting the DPRK’s 
growing nuclear capabilities, and maintaining a stable regional balance of power� 
The 2016 General Security of Military Information Agreement, which improved 
intelligence and information sharing among the three militaries, represented 
a major improvement in trilateral cooperation� Nevertheless, progress toward 
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trilateral cooperation remains tenu-
ous at best and could be disrupted 
by an ROK SSN program�
Nuclear Proliferation Concerns
A nuclear propulsion system could 
improve the ROK’s latent nuclear 
capabilities, undermining U�S� 
nonproliferation objectives� Joseph 
Pilat defines nuclear latency as “the 
possession of many or all of the 
technologies, facilities, materials, 
expertise (including tacit knowl-
edge), resources and other capabili-
ties necessary for the development 
of nuclear weapons, without full 
operational weaponization�”46 If 
South Korea were to fuel SSNs inde-
pendently, its latent nuclear capabilities would be enhanced in several ways� SSN 
reactors require enriched uranium� Uranium enrichment, currently restricted 
under the U�S� Atomic Energy Act, section 123 (also known as the 123 agree-
ment), is a key prerequisite for a functional nuclear program� Still more prob-
lematically, the most powerful SSN reactors use HEU containing over 20 percent 
U-235� As table 3 emphasizes, many of the leading global navies rely on SSNs 
fueled by HEU� HEU is fissile material—often 90 percent or more U-235—that 
can be used to develop a nuclear weapon� That being the case, ROK production 
of HEU would strengthen substantially the country’s latent ability to produce 
nuclear weaponry and would pose serious nonproliferation challenges�
SSN reactors also would produce uranium waste that would need a dis-
posal plan� Some in South Korea have argued that reprocessing (including pyro- 
processing) is required to manage the ROK’s dwindling storage space for spent 
fuel� As with uranium enrichment, reprocessing—a process that can be used 
to produce plutonium—can serve as the basis for a nuclear weapons program� 
Overall, fueling and operating SSN naval reactors would bring South Korea closer 
to mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle, which would advance its latent nuclear 
capabilities�
Other states have used naval reactor programs for this purpose� In the 1970s, 
for instance, Brazil used work on its naval reactor as part of a broader push to 
conquer the nuclear fuel cycle and potentially develop a nuclear weapon�47 Iran 
similarly has threatened to use work on a naval reactor to advance its latent 
nuclear capability� In 2012, during negotiations over the Iranian nuclear accord, 
Country SSN Fuel: Level of Enrichment (% U-235)
United States HEU (93–97�5)
United Kingdom HEU (93)
Russiaa HEU (40)
India HEU (40)
Brazilb LEU (18–19)
France LEU (5–7�5)
PRC LEU (3–5)
Notes: 
HEU = highly enriched uranium; LEU = low-enriched uranium; PRC = People’s Republic 
of China; SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine. 
a. Third- and fourth-generation SSNs.
b. Experimental reactor.
Source: George Moore, Cervando Banuelos, and Thomas Gray, Replacing Highly Enriched 
Uranium in Naval Reactors (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 2016).
TABLE 3
SSN FUEL ENRICHMENT LEVELS BY COUNTRY
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Iran announced it would be developing an SSN; this constituted an attempt to 
strengthen its bargaining position by threatening to advance its latent nuclear 
potential�48 Similarly, in 2017, Iran resumed its work on this naval reactor to put 
pressure on the new U�S� administration�49
Opportunity Costs
An ROK SSN program also would bring with it sizable opportunity costs� The 
ROK’s planned budget for 2019 was roughly $415 billion and included around 
forty-two billion dollars in defense spending—an 8�2 percent increase year over 
year� Yet although ROK military expenditure is increasing, it is far from unlim-
ited� While an SSN fleet would provide a dramatic and powerful new capability 
for the ROK Navy, the funds required for the project would have to be diverted 
away from other programs that could advance allied interests� More specifically, 
this qualitative improvement could come at the expense of quantitative increases 
to the ROK naval arsenal�50 Alternatively, this funding could be used for missile 
defenses, air forces, or ground forces, or it could be invested in the ROK economy�
A simple comparison illustrates the opportunity costs of an ROK SSN� Table 
4 highlights some of the potential alternative systems and equipment in which 
South Korea could invest to strengthen its ability to deter and defeat North Ko-
rea and better secure the maritime commons� If we assume that an ROK SSN 
would have a per-unit cost similar to that of Virginia-class SSNs—around $2�5 
billion each—this would mean that for the price of a single SSN South Korea al-
most could acquire three of its most advanced guided-missile destroyers (of the 
Sejong the Great, KDX-III class) to augment its growing blue-water capabilities� 
Name of Equipment/Platform Type of Equipment/Platform Cost per Unit (U.S.$)
Virginia class Nuclear attack submarine $2�5 billion
Sejong the Great class Guided-missile destroyer $923 million
Jangbogo III class Diesel-electric attack submarine $900 million
THAAD battery Ballistic-missile defense system $800 million
Son Won-il class Diesel-electric attack submarine $300 million
Dokdo class Amphibious assault ship $288 million
P-8 Poseidon Antisubmarine warfare aircraft $256�5 million
Note: THAAD = terminal high-altitude area defense. 
Sources: Keck and Sokolski, “South Korea Is About to Make a $7 Billion Nuclear Submarine Blunder”; Andrew Clark, “Australia’s Barracuda Subma-
rines: Too Expensive and Too Little, Too Late,” Australia Financial Review, 1 June 2017, www.afr.com/; “KDX-III Sejong Destroyer,” Global Security, 
www.globalsecurity.org/; Franz Stefan-Gady, “South Korea to Develop Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” The Diplomat, 2 June 2016, thediplomat 
.com/; Amanda Macias, “North Korea Will Now Have America’s Most Advanced Missile System in Its Backyard,” Business Insider, 9 July 2016, www 
.businessinsider.com/; “History of Patrol Squadron Eight: Continuing a Legacy of Excellence,” United States Navy, 17 March 2014, www.public.navy.mil/.
TABLE 4
THE COMPARATIVE COST OF SSNs
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Alternatively, to improve its ASW capabilities, South Korea could use this money 
to increase the quantity of its undersea assets vastly� For the price of a single SSN 
it almost could acquire three new advanced Jangbogo III–class SSKs or as many as 
eight smaller Son Won-il–class SSKs� South Korea also could upgrade its missile-
defense capabilities significantly, adding three new THAAD missile defense bat-
teries for around the same price� The allies could benefit significantly from the 
addition of any of these other capabilities� 
The preceding section emphasizes that an ROK SSN program may create some 
significant challenges for key U�S� interests in the Indo-Pacific� Several of these 
hazards might make the United States think twice about supporting an ROK SSN 
program� Nonetheless, U�S� coordination with South Korea can help offset some 
of those risks� More importantly, as will be highlighted below, U�S� assistance with 
an ROK SSN program could benefit both countries’ interests in several important 
ways�
THE CASE FOR U.S. SUPPORT
Managing Risks
If the United States provides support and assistance to South Korea in develop-
ing an SSN fleet, it is likely to have greater influence over how South Korea pur-
sues the program� In particular, the United States would be better positioned to 
dampen potential ROK-Japan tensions and address nonproliferation challenges� 
In contrast, if the United States refrains from supporting an ROK SSN program it 
sacrifices any leverage it might be able to exercise over how South Korea designs 
or uses its SSN fleet�
U�S� participation in an ROK SSN program could improve America’s ability to 
prevent unnecessary tensions between Japan and South Korea� First, as Japan’s 
closest ally, the United States is well positioned to reassure Japan that U�S�-ROK 
cooperation on an SSN program is not intended to threaten Japan’s maritime se-
curity� Indeed, given the substantial overlap between Japanese and ROK interests 
in deterring North Korea and preserving a secure, stable Indo-Pacific, Washing-
ton could work to convince Tokyo that Japan stands to gain from enhanced ROK 
naval capabilities� Second, the United States could leverage its support for the 
ROK’s SSN program to encourage South Korea to amplify its maritime coopera-
tion with Japan� This could include expanding existing trilateral naval exchanges, 
maritime exercises, and intelligence-sharing arrangements� If the United States 
chooses to remain uninvolved in the ROK’s SSN development, however, Japan 
likely will see the program as more threatening and South Korea may be less will-
ing to work more closely with Japan on maritime security�
11
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U�S� leverage also should improve Washington’s ability to mitigate nonpro-
liferation concerns created by an ROK SSN program� In particular, the United 
States could work to convince South Korea to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
rather than HEU� LEU is not fissile and would be more difficult to convert into 
a nuclear weapon, so it would pose far fewer proliferation concerns� The United 
States also could offer to provide South Korea with the fuel necessary for an 
LEU SSN, removing the need for South Korea to enrich its own fuel� This would 
dampen further the effect of an SSN program on the ROK’s latent nuclear ca-
pabilities� However, if the United States withholds support for the ROK’s SSN 
development it may find it more difficult to persuade South Korea to address U�S� 
nonproliferation concerns�
Alliance Cohesion
A U�S�-assisted ROK SSN program would have substantial ramifications for the 
strength of the U�S�-ROK alliance relationship� First, support would serve as a 
clear and credible signal of U�S� commitment to the alliance, reducing the ROK’s 
fear of abandonment�51 Public affirmations of alliance commitment are relatively 
“cheap” and therefore not particularly credible unless accompanied by costly 
signals that uncommitted states would be unwilling to issue�52 Since U�S� support 
for an ROK SSN program would involve transferring sensitive technology and 
expertise, it would serve as a credible signal of U�S� commitment to its alliance 
with the ROK� Second, the transfer of sensitive technology and expertise would 
help highlight the enduring benefits of the alliance for South Korea� By reducing 
the ROK’s fears of abandonment and increasing the direct benefits of its partner-
ship with the United States, assistance would shore up the strength of this critical 
alliance�
Conversely, a U�S� decision to oppose an ROK SSN program likely would cause 
significant damage to the U�S�-ROK alliance� Several ongoing trends have weak-
ened this important alliance already� President Donald Trump’s transactional 
perspective on U�S� alliance relationships, expressed both on the campaign trail 
and while in office, has caused some concern in South Korea over the strength 
of the U�S� commitment to ROK security�53 The recent decision to cancel ULCHI 
FREEDOM GUARDIAN and other major military exercises with South Korea to 
accommodate DPRK demands has contributed further to the ROK’s fears of 
abandonment� Alarmingly, polling data indicate that ROK citizens increasingly 
believe that the United States does not take the ROK’s national interests into 
consideration when determining policy�54 Were U�S� policy makers to oppose 
the ROK’s SSN program actively, this likely would reinforce these growing fears 
of abandonment in South Korea� This in turn might lead South Korea to hedge 
against abandonment by jumping on the PRC bandwagon, appeasing North 
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Korea, or balancing against these threats by initiating a nuclear-weapons pro-
gram� None of these possible courses would advance U�S� national interests�
The United States has used the transfer of military technology to reinforce its 
alliances and security partnerships successfully in the past� U�S�-U�K� cooperation 
on naval nuclear propulsion in the late 1950s provides a telling example� The 
U�S�-U�K� dispute during the divisive Suez crisis in 1956 left President Dwight D� 
Eisenhower looking for a way to reinforce the shaken alliance with the United 
Kingdom� At the same time, Eisenhower hoped to build up British military ca-
pabilities so that the United Kingdom, and NATO more broadly, could assume 
more responsibility for the growing burden of deterring an increasingly power-
ful Soviet Union� To accomplish these objectives, Eisenhower sought to transfer 
naval nuclear technology to assist the United Kingdom in developing its own 
SSN�55 Under the leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover, USN, and Admiral 
Louis Mountbatten, RN, the allies began sharing technological knowledge about 
naval nuclear propulsion to strengthen their alliance and reinforce the United 
Kingdom’s independent capabilities�56
Although U�S� domestic politics complicated this process, in 1958 the allies 
succeeded in creating the U�S�-U�K� Mutual Defense Agreement, which autho-
rized the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology between the allies� This in-
cluded the sale of an American-made Westinghouse S5W naval nuclear reactor 
to the United Kingdom and the training of British submariners in the United 
States� This allowed the United Kingdom to develop its first SSN—HMS Dread-
nought—powered by the S5W� It also facilitated the development of the United 
Kingdom’s first fully indigenous SSNs, the Valiant class, powered by the “son of 
S5W,” a Rolls-Royce pressurized-water reactor�57 This cooperation had a major 
impact on the strength and cohesion of the U�S�-U�K� alliance� On completion 
of HMS Dreadnought, U�K� leaders praised the U�S� contribution to British naval 
capabilities�58 Two leading RN officers later remarked that the “UK’s debt to the 
U�S� Navy, and to Admiral Rickover in particular, is incalculable�”59
Just as importantly, U�S� decisions to withhold capabilities from allies have 
undermined alliance cohesion in the past� In the 1970s, for instance, President 
Jimmy Carter’s decision to block the sale of the F-16 fighter jet to South Korea 
further compounded the ROK’s concerns about abandonment amid an intra-
allied dispute over the ROK’s human rights practices�60 Similarly, Japan’s attempt 
to acquire the F-22 fighter jet from the United States late in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century came to be seen as a litmus test of U�S� commitment to the 
alliance�61 The reluctance to transfer the F-22, because of the sensitive technol-
ogy involved, was framed in Japan as a sign that the United States was less than 
fully committed to Japan’s defense� This contributed to Japan’s emerging concerns 
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about abandonment amid the American financial crisis and its decision to delist 
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism�
Coercive Diplomacy with North Korea
An SSN program also could strengthen the allies’ coercive diplomacy toward 
North Korea� Coercive diplomacy here refers to the allies’ efforts to convince 
North Korea to comply with their will through threats to use force�62 The United 
States and South Korea use coercive diplomacy to deter DPRK aggression and 
compel an end to the DPRK’s advancing nuclear and missile programs, including 
its SLBM program� An ROK SSN program could assist with this task by serving 
as a signal of resolve, strengthening deterrence by denial, and providing a useful 
asset for gunboat diplomacy�
An SSN program could be employed as a powerful signal to North Korea of 
the allies’ resolve to secure the Korean littoral and prevent the continued ad-
vancement of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities� SSNs are expensive, 
controversial, and technically challenging platforms, given the nuclear technol-
ogy required for their development and operation� The ROK’s willingness to 
bear the costs of acquiring and operating this platform would serve as a credible 
signal reinforcing the ROK’s unwillingness to tolerate the DPRK’s illicit weapons 
programs� Furthermore, as mentioned above, support by the United States would 
serve as a credible signal of its resolve to defend South Korea against emerging 
challenges� By sinking funds into their defenses that irresolute states would be 
unwilling to commit, the allies would reduce the chances that North Korea will 
underestimate their commitment to their defense�63
ROK SSNs also could help dissuade North Korea from developing, deploy-
ing, or using SLBMs and SSBs through the threat of denial�64 Current ROK ASW 
capabilities are relatively limited, despite the recent acquisition of new ASW 
helicopters�65 An SSN fleet would provide a strengthened ASW capability, im-
proving the ability of the ROK fleet to track and eliminate DPRK submarines� In 
peacetime, SSNs could rely on their exceptional endurance (see table 5) to loiter 
for extended periods concealed beneath the surface at a safe distance from DPRK 
submarine bases such as Mayang Do to monitor SSB activity using passive sonar� 
In contrast, SSKs would struggle with this task, as they are required to surface 
periodically; even with AIP technology, the ROK’s most advanced submarines 
can transit for only two weeks or so without snorkeling� If a DPRK SSB were to 
deploy, the ROK SSN also could tail and monitor the SSB indefinitely, with or 
without the assistance of allied destroyers and U�S� P-3 Orion aircraft�
Just as importantly, in the event of a conflict ROK SSNs could eliminate pre-
emptively the threat that DPRK SLBMs posed� As highlighted in table 5, SSNs’ 
superior speed would give them an edge over the ROK’s current SSKs in find-
ing and eliminating the DPRK’s SSBs at sea before they could surface to deploy 
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SLBMs—“killing the arrow�” Alternatively, if the SSNs were equipped with vertical- 
launch systems and cruise missiles, they could target DPRK ports directly before 
DPRK submarines put to sea—“killing the archer�”66 
SSNs would amplify the ROK’s ASW capabilities significantly and thereby 
reduce the DPRK’s incentives to continue pursuing an SLBM capability or to 
deploy any SSBs that it develops�67 If North Korea appreciates that SSBs will be 
unable to provide it a secure second-strike capability, given the allies’ ability to 
destroy this capability preemptively, it may be less willing to bear the significant 
cost of further developing this challenging technology� Furthermore, if North 
Korea understands that any SSB it does develop is likely to be tracked and could 
be eliminated if it puts to sea, it may be less likely to deploy these assets� If South 
Korea can deny North Korea the ability to use its SSBs, North Korea also will be 
less emboldened by any SLBM capability it acquires� Without the secure second-
strike capability offered by an SSB, North Korea will find it riskier to engage in 
“salami-slicing tactics” or other steps short of war designed to undermine allied 
security�68
Finally, ROK SSNs could be particularly useful as a tool for gunboat diploma-
cy� Gunboat diplomacy refers to states’ deployment and maneuvering of naval as-
sets to signal capabilities and resolve to an adversary during a dispute� SSNs, able 
to move stealthily and remain concealed for extended periods, can be surfaced 
in sensitive areas as implicit threats�69 This gunboat diplomacy would highlight 
the ROK’s ability to strike key DPRK maritime capabilities, serving as a useful 
reminder of the costs of conflict with the allies�
States frequently have relied on naval capabilities to bolster coercive diplo-
macy� President Ronald W� Reagan used a major naval buildup coupled with 
the publicly released 1986 Maritime Strategy (work on this began in 1982 with a 
classified briefing) to signal U�S� resolve to resist Soviet revisionism and main-
tain maritime supremacy�70 As one of the strategy’s key architects, Secretary of 
the Navy John Lehman, argued, “a key element of the 1982 Strategy was signal-
ing America’s renewed commitment to naval power to both our adversaries 
Platform ROK Jangbogo III Class USN Virginia Class
Propulsion Diesel-electric with AIP Nuclear: S9G reactor
Endurance 2 weeks Unlimited
Top speed (submerged) 20 kt 35 kt
Notes: AIP = air-independent propulsion; kt = knots; ROK = Republic of Korea. 
Sources: “U.S. Navy Fact File: Virginia Class Submarine,” www.navy.mil/; “South Korea to Order 5 More U-214 AIP Submarines to Bridge to Indigenous 
Boats,” Defense Industry Daily, 8 May 2015, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/.
TABLE 5
THE ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR ASW
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and allies�”71 The Maritime Strategy also bolstered deterrence by denial through 
strengthening naval war-fighting capabilities, allowing the United States to deny 
to the Soviets the ability to interdict U�S� supply lines to Europe� Furthermore, it 
augmented U�S� ability to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk, raising the cost to the Soviet 
Union should it engage in conventional escalation in Europe�72
British military operations around the Falkland Islands provide particu-
larly useful insights into the utility of SSNs for deterrence� In 1977, Operation 
JOURNEYMAN saw British SSNs deployed to the waters surrounding the contested 
islands successfully deter Argentine encroachment�73 Again, in 1982, during 
the Falklands War, the presence of several British SSNs helped deter Argentina 
from operating in the British-delineated military exclusion zone� Furthermore, 
after a U�K� SSN, HMS Conqueror, sank an Argentine light cruiser, ARA General 
Belgrano, the entire Argentine navy remained consigned to port, unable to put 
to sea for fear of being destroyed by British SSNs� Subsequently, Britain was able 
to secure control of the sea and cut off Argentine ground forces on the Falklands 
from sea supply�74
Russia’s frequent use of SSNs for gunboat diplomacy during the Cold War 
similarly highlights the platform’s usefulness for coercive signaling� As Brent 
Ditzler argues in a 1989 thesis, “In what has become a standard pattern, a por-
tion of the Soviet submarines involved in exercises and other diplomatic shows of 
force, routinely surface for prolonged periods and/or subsequently make highly 
visible port calls to friendly nations in the vicinity� This exposure is tactically 
unnecessary, and can therefore be assumed to have some diplomatic meaning�”75 
Reinforcing this argument, a retired Russian admiral argues that during the 
1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Soviet navy used SSNs for the express purpose of 
gunboat diplomacy: “The Chief Commander’s order was that our submarines 
should surface when the Americans appear� It was done to demonstrate to them 
that we had nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean� So when our subs surfaced, 
they recognized us� In the way of the American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers, 
destroyers, and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles�”76
Allied Blue-Water Collaboration
SSNs also would offer South Korea the ability to bolster its emerging blue-
water naval capabilities, strengthening the U�S�-ROK alliance’s global maritime 
potential� Presently, South Korea is limited largely to green-water capabilities; 
it prioritizes the defense of Korean littoral waters rather than operations on 
the high seas or in foreign littoral waters�77 Its primary existing blue-water 
assets are the advanced Chungmugong Yi Sun-shin (KDX-II) and Sejong the 
Great–class (KDX-III) destroyers, as well as the Dokdo-class amphibious as-
sault ship, which was designed as the centerpiece of a future rapid-response 
fleet�78 Currently, the underwater support for Dokdo and the KDX destroyers 
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is limited to the Son Won-il– and Jangbogo III–class SSKs, which would limit 
the range and speed of the rapid-response fleet�79 As highlighted by table 6, an 
SSN could provide better support for this blue-water fleet, allowing it to move 
faster and farther from friendly ports� Just as importantly, the SSN fleet could 
operate independently in blue-water environments, given SSNs’ speed and vir-
tually unlimited range and endurance� Overall, an ROK SSN program would 
constitute a key step toward a more effective rapid-response fleet and a stronger 
blue-water capability�
The greater blue-water capabilities conferred by an ROK SSN fleet could allow 
the U�S�-ROK alliance to contribute more actively to regional and global security 
beyond the Korean Peninsula� South Korea could employ these assets to assist the 
United States in patrolling and protecting SLOCs throughout the Indo-Pacific� 
Indeed, South Korea already has demonstrated its interest in assuming a broader 
role in global sea-lane security alongside the United States, contributing forces 
to protecting shipping lanes against piracy in the distant Gulf of Aden�80 South 
Korea also could use its strengthened blue-water capabilities to track and in-
terdict illegal shipments bound for North Korea, in line with the Proliferation 
Security Initiative� Furthermore, rapid-response fleets escorted by SSNs could 
contribute more quickly and effectively to peacekeeping, humanitarian, and 
counterpiracy operations abroad� ROK SSNs also could support USN operations 
throughout the Indo-Pacific by escorting and assisting carrier strike groups�81
These contributions would serve to strengthen the allies’ expanding “global 
partnership�”82 As Presidents Moon and Trump highlighted in their joint state-
ment in June 2017, “United States–ROK cooperation on global issues is an indis-
pensable and expanding aspect of the Alliance�”83 A U�S�-ROK partnership with a 
greater blue-water capability and focus would represent a significant step toward 
the collaborative approach to maintaining global maritime security envisioned 
by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, first published in 2007, 
updated in 2015� The USN strategy emphasizes “the potential for a global net-
work of navies that brings together the contributions of like-minded nations and 
organizations around the world to address mutual maritime security challenges 
and respond to natural disasters�”84 To help move toward this network, the strat-
egy document states that the United States will “support our allies and partners 
through training, exercises, and the provision of capabilities, via foreign military 
sales and financing, to increase their capacity to address maritime security chal-
lenges�” The rationale behind the Cooperative Strategy’s “global network,” which 
builds on the “1,000-ship navy” coalition concept advocated by Admiral Mike 
Mullen, USN (Ret�), is sound�85 The United States needs stronger partnerships 
with more-capable regional navies to help defend against the emerging threats 
to the maritime commons� The PRC’s growing assertiveness throughout the 
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Indo-Pacific maritime commons is of particular concern� Friendly navies willing 
to assume greater responsibility and acquire more-robust capabilities are a wel-
come prospect; while the United States will continue to bear much of the burden 
for maritime security throughout the world, it cannot carry the load alone�86 
South Korea is uniquely well positioned to form a key part of this partnership in 
the Indo-Pacific, strengthening and broadening the U�S�-ROK alliance� 
The role of SSNs in enhancing a maritime power’s blue-water and power-
projection capabilities is recognized widely� The Soviet Union relied on SSNs as 
the basis for its blue-water fleet, rather than a large surface fleet or naval avia-
tion�87 Brazil’s fledgling SSN program is viewed similarly as the centerpiece of a 
new blue-water navy�88 The United States also regularly uses SSNs as part of its 
forward-deployed naval presence—both independently and as support for its 
carrier battle groups—far from its shores�
U�S�-U�K� cooperation on the U�K� SSN program in the 1950s helped the Unit-
ed Kingdom assume a bigger role in allied blue-water operations to counter the 
Soviet Union at sea� The United Kingdom was able to contribute more to allied 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on the Soviet navy farther from 
U�K� shores because of the added endurance and sensor capabilities of its SSNs� 
As Anthony Wells highlights, the two countries used their advanced capabilities 
to great effect: “[T]he United States and United Kingdom together built a data 
base on every Soviet submarine class and every hull within each class� � � � Speed, 
depth, operating characteristics, and crew performance could all be observed 
and recorded� � � � The superior stealth of well-handled U�S� and U�K� submarines 
permitted penetration of the most sensitive and dangerous areas to observe and 
record weapons trials�”89 The U�K�’s SSNs not only strengthened the country’s 
contribution to its own defense; they also contributed directly to the defense of 
the United States by guarding the Iceland-Greenland gap�90 Similarly, the United 
Boat ROK Son Won-il Class USN Virginia Class
Propulsion Diesel-electric with AIP Nuclear: S9G reactor
Top speed (submerged) 20 kt 35 kt
Range (submerged) 420 nm at 8 kt Unlimited
Top speed (surfaced) 12 kt 25 kt
Range (surfaced) 12,000 nm at 6 kt Unlimited
Notes: AIP = air-independent propulsion; kt = knots;  nm = nautical miles; ROK = Republic of Korea. 
Sources: Richard Tomkins, “New GenDyn Submarine Completes Alpha Trials,” UPI Press, 7 August 2014, www.upi.com/; “South Korea to Order 5 More 
U-214 AIP Submarines to Bridge to Indigenous Boats.”
TABLE 6
THE ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR POWER PROJECTION
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Kingdom was able to use its SSNs to project power across the Atlantic Ocean 
during the Falklands War�
Overall, an ROK SSN program presents a host of potential benefits and risks for 
the U�S�-ROK alliance� As this article argues, such an SSN program could under-
cut Sino-allied and ROK-Japan relations, lead to fears about ROK latent nuclear 
capabilities, and incur sizable opportunity costs� These costs merit serious con-
sideration� Nonetheless, the United States would stand to gain significantly by 
assisting its ally in acquiring this capability� Such a policy would strengthen the 
U�S�-ROK alliance’s cohesion, coercive bargaining position, and blue-water capa-
bilities� Playing an active role in the development of the ROK’s SSN program also 
would give the United States more leverage over the way in which this capability 
is developed, helping it better offset some of the program’s risks�
The underlying question—whether South Korea itself should pursue this 
program—is still up for debate� There is little doubt that such a project would be 
a truly herculean undertaking� Its advisability depends on the ROK’s strategic vi-
sion for itself� If South Korea is content with securing only its immediate territory 
using a powerful land force and a green-water navy well suited for littoral opera-
tions, then an SSN fleet may be superfluous� If, however, South Korea wishes to 
become a blue-water power, capable of projecting power and contributing to the 
security of far-flung SLOCs, SSNs may be indispensable�
N O T E S
 1� The Moon administration has emphasized 
repeatedly that South Korea “needs nuclear 
submarines in this era�” South Korea has 
mentioned its desire for this asset several 
times in high-level talks with the United 
States, has commissioned a civilian study of 
the feasibility and desirability of the project, 
and has developed a military task force to 
consider the development of an ROK SSN� 
Jun Ji-hy, “South Korea Moving to Build 
Nuclear-Powered Submarines,” Korea Times, 
20 September 2017, www�koreatimes�co�kr/�
 2� The authors are grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for highlighting this point�
 3� “Joint Statement between the United States 
and Republic of Korea,” 30 June 2017, avail-
able at www�whitehouse�gov/�
 4� Ibid�
 5� Zachary Cohen and Ryan Browne, “US 
Detects ‘Highly Unusual’ North Korean Sub-
marine Activity,” CNN, 1 August 2017, www 
�cnn�com/; Sofia Lotto Persio, “North Korea 
Wants to Launch Missiles from Sea amid ‘Un-
precedented’ Submarine Activity,” Newsweek, 
1 August 2017, www�newsweek�com/�
 6� This effect has been observed in India- 
Pakistan relations following Pakistan’s 
acquisition of a nuclear deterrent� See S� Paul 
Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford Univ� Press, 2007); S� Paul 
Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: 
Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold 
War Europe,” International Security 30, no� 
2 (2005)� For a similar argument about Iran, 
see Matthew Kroenig, A Time to Attack: The 
Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat (New York: 
Macmillan, 2014)�
19
Yu and French: Should the United States Support a Republic of Korea Nuclear Subm
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 Y U  &  F R E N C H  1 0 3
 7� James Hackett and Mark Fitzpatrick, “The 
Conventional Military Balance on the Korean 
Peninsula,” International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 11 June 2018, www�iiss�org/�
 8� “KN-11 (Pukkuksong-1),” Missile Threat: 
CSIS Missile Defense Project, 15 June 2018, 
missilethreat�csis�org/�
 9� “Korea, US to Devise Plan to Negate N�K� 
Launchers,” Korea Herald, 16 April 2015, 
www�koreaherald�com/; Elizabeth Shim, 
“Strategy to ‘Destroy’ North Korea Missiles to 
Be Applied during Exercises,” UPI, 7 February 
2017, www�upi�com/�
 10� Raul Pedrozo, “China’s Legacy Maritime 
Claims,” Lawfare (blog), 15 July 2016, www 
�lawfareblog�com/�
 11� Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Video Shows Near Col-
lision of US and Chinese Warships,” Navy 
Times, 5 November 2018, www�navytimes 
�com/�
 12� Michael Green et al�, Countering Coercion in 
Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray 
Zone Deterrence (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2017)�
 13� Terrence Kelly, David Gompert, and Duncan 
Long, Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, vol� 1, 
Exploiting U.S. Advantages to Prevent Aggres-
sion (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016)�
 14� Kim Gamel, “With Clock Ticking, US, S� 
Korea Fail to Reach Deal on Military Cost-
Sharing,” Stars and Stripes, 14 December 
2018, www�stripes�com/�
 15� Sangram Singh Byce and Rajni Kant Tewari, 
Anti-submarine Warfare: Fighting the Invisible 
Enemy (New Delhi: Anamaya Publishers, 
2006)�
 16� Edward Whitman, “Air-Independent Propul-
sion: AIP Technology Creates a New Under-
sea Threat,” Undersea Warfare 13 (2001)�
 17� Byce and Tewari, Anti-submarine Warfare.
 18� Simon Cowan, Future Submarine Project 
Should Raise Periscope for Another Look 
(Washington, DC: Center for Independent 
Studies, 2012)�
 19� Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, “The Status of 
Brazil’s Ambitious PROSUB Program,” Center 
for International Maritime Security, 22 No-
vember 2016, cimsec�org/�
 20� USN Submarine Force Pacific, “SUBPAC 
Commands,” Commander, Submarine Force, 
U.S. Pacific Fleet, www�csp�navy�mil/�
 21� Zachary Keck, “South Korea Goes ‘All In’ on 
Submarines,” The Diplomat, 17 August 2013, 
thediplomat�com/�
 22� Choi Yeon-jin, “Seoul to Review Building 
Nuclear-Powered Submarine,” Chosun Ilbo, 1 
August 2017, english�chosun�com/�
 23� Sohn Ji-young, “Can South Korea Develop 
Its Own Nuclear Submarine,” Korea Herald, 1 
August 2017, www�koreaherald�com/�
 24� Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Secu-
rity Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no� 2 (1978)�
 25� Adam P� Liff, “China and the US Alliance 
System,” China Quarterly 233 (March 2018), 
pp� 137–65�
 26� “Does China Have an Effective Sea-Based 
Nuclear Deterrent?,” China Power, 28 Decem-
ber 2015, chinapower�csis�org/�
 27� Nicole Freiner, “What China’s RIMPAC Ex-
clusion Means for US Allies,” The Diplomat, 
26 May 2018, thediplomat�com/; Shannon 
van Sant, “China Fires Back against U�S� 
Sanctions for Purchases of Russian Weapons,” 
NPR, 21 September 2018, www�npr�org/; “A 
Quick Guide to the US-China Trade War,” 
BBC News, 7 January 2019, www�bbc�com/�
 28� “China Denies Hong Kong Port Visit for U�S� 
Navy Ship amid Trade Tensions,” Reuters, 25 
September 2018, www�reuters�com/; Jane Per-
lez, “China Cancels High-Level Security Talks 
with the U�S�,” New York Times, 30 September 
2018, www�nytimes�com/�
 29� Dave Majumdar, “Is South Korea Getting 
Ready to Build Nuclear Submarines?,”  
National Interest, 19 October 2016,  
nationalinterest�org/�
 30� Robert Jervis, Perception and Mispercep-
tion in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ� Press, 1976), chap� 3; Charles 
Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military 
Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral 
and Deterrence Models,” World Politics 44, 
no� 4 (1992)�
 31� See, for example, Stephen Walt, The Origins 
of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ� Press, 
1987)�
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/6
 1 0 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 32� Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German 
Antagonism: 1860–1914 (Amherst, MA: 
Humanity Books, 1980)�
 33� Giles Edwards, “How the Dreadnought 
Sparked the 20th Century’s First Arms Race,” 
BBC Magazine, 2 June 2014, www�bbc�com/�
 34� Mackenzie Eaglen and Jon Rodeback, Sub-
marine Arms Race in the Pacific: The Chinese 
Challenge to US Undersea Supremacy (Wash-
ington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2010); Elias 
Groll and Dan De Luce, “China Is Fueling a 
Submarine Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific,” 
Foreign Policy, 26 August 2016, foreignpolicy 
�com/�
 35� Groll and De Luce, “China Is Fueling a Sub-
marine Arms Race�”
 36� For instance, see Prashanth Parameswaran, 
“Did Thailand Secretly Approve Its China 
Submarine Buy?,” The Diplomat, 27 April 
2017, thediplomat�com/�
 37� Jeevan Vasagar, “Asian Submarine Race Raises 
Security Concerns,” Financial Times, 17 May 
2017, www�ft�com/�
 38� Michael D� Swaine, “China’s Views on South 
Korea’s Deployment of THAAD,” China 
Leadership Monitor 52 (2017); Hwang Hojun, 
“China Installs Radar That Can Monitor S� Ko-
rea, Japan and Western Pacific: Media,” Arirang 
News, 13 March 2017, www�arirang�com/�
 39� Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova, China’s 
Response to U.S.–South Korean Missile Defense 
System Deployment and Its Implications 
(Washington, DC: U�S�-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 2017)�
 40� Swaine, “China’s Views on South Korea’s 
Deployment of THAAD�”
 41� Meick and Salidjanova, China’s Response to 
U.S.–South Korean Missile Defense System.
 42� Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, The 
Japan–South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian 
Security and the United States (New York: 
Columbia Univ� Press, 2015)�
 43� Joyce Lee and Yimou Lee, “South Korea 
Marks First ‘Comfort Women’ Day, Joined 
by Protestors in Taiwan,” Reuters, 13 August 
2018, www�reuters�com/�
 44� Isabel Reynolds and Shinhye Kand, “South 
Korea Court Says Japan Firm Must Pay for 
Forced WWII Labor,” Bloomberg, 30 October 
2018, www�bloomberg�com/�
 45� “The 5th Japan–South Korea Joint Public 
Opinion Poll (2017): Analysis Report on 
Comparative Data,” The Genron NPO, 20 July 
2017, www�genron-npo�net/�
 46� Joseph Pilat, Exploring Nuclear Latency 
(Washington, DC: Wilson International Cen-
ter for Scholars, 2014)�
 47� Antônio de Almeida Silva and José de Moura, 
“The Brazilian Navy’s Nuclear-Powered Sub-
marine Program,” Nonproliferation Review 23, 
nos� 5–6 (2016)�
 48� “Iran Plans Nuclear-Powered Submarine: 
Report,” Reuters, 12 July 2012, www�reuters 
�com/�
 49� “Blasting US Nuke-Deal ‘Violations,’ Iran 
Vows New Nuclear Project,” CBS News, 13 
December 2016, www�cbsnews�com/�
 50� Terence Roehrig, “South Korea: Nuclear Sub-
marines Not Worth the Cost,” The Interpreter, 
21 November 2017, www�lowyinstitute�org/; 
Zachary Keck and Henry Sokolski, “South 
Korea Is About to Make a $7 Billion Nuclear 
Submarine Blunder,” National Interest, 30 
September 2017, nationalinterest�org/�
 51� Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and 
Zack Cooper, “How Can Donald Trump 
Reassure Nervous US Allies? By Giving Them 
Weapons,” Washington Post, 13 January 2017, 
www�washingtonpost�com/; Keren Yarhi-
Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, 
“To Arm or to Ally? The Patron’s Dilemma 
and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers 
and Alliances,” International Security 41, no� 2 
(Fall 2016)�
 52� Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New 
Haven, CT: Yale Univ� Press, 1966)�
 53� Hanbyeol Sohn, “3 Obstacles to US–South 
Korea Cooperation on the North Korea  
Issue,” The Diplomat, 27 June 2017,  
thediplomat�com/; Demetri Sevastopulo 
and Katrina Manson, “US Faces Struggle to 
Ease Asian Allies’ Fears of Retreat,” Financial 
Times, 2 June 2017, www�ft�com/; John Power, 
“Donald Trump’s Problem with the US-Korea 
Alliance,” The Diplomat, 23 July 2015,  
thediplomat�com/�
21
Yu and French: Should the United States Support a Republic of Korea Nuclear Subm
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 Y U  &  F R E N C H  1 0 5
 54� Richard Wike et al�, “Trump’s International 
Ratings Remain Low, Especially among Key 
Allies,” Pew Research Center, 1 October 2018, 
www�pewglobal�org/�
 55� James Jinks and Peter Hennessy, The Silent 
Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 
1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2015); John Baylis, 
“The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence 
Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interde-
pendence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no� 
3 (2008); Duncan Redford, “The ‘Hallmark 
of a First-Class Navy’: The Nuclear-Powered 
Submarine in the Royal Navy, 1960–77,” 
Contemporary British History 23, no� 2 (2009), 
p� 171�
 56� Jinks and Hennessy, The Silent Deep�
 57� Ibid�
 58� Walter Waggoner, “Atom Submarine Begun 
by Britain: Prince Philip Hails US Help as He 
Symbolically Lays Keel of Dreadnought,” New 
York Times, 13 June 1959�
 59� R� Baker and L� J� Rydill, “The Building of the 
Two Dreadnoughts,” in European Shipbuild-
ing: One Hundred Years of Change, ed� F� 
M� Walker and A� Slaven (London: Marine 
Publications International, 1983)�
 60� Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two 
Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: 
Basic Books, 2014), p� 108�
 61� “U�S� F-22 Sale Could Hinge on Security 
Trust,” Japan Times, 8 July 2007, www 
�japantimes�co�jp/�
 62� See Schelling, Arms and Influence, and 
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ� Press, 1960)�
 63� James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy 
Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no� 1 (1997); 
Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict 
among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, 
and System Structure in International Crises 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ� Press, 1977)�
 64� See Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: 
Toward a Theory of National Security (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton Univ� Press, 1961)�
 65� For an overview of the gaps in ROK ASW, 
see Yoji Koda [VAdm�, JMSDF (Ret�)], “The 
Emerging Republic of Korea Navy: A Japa-
nese Perspective,” Naval War College Review 
63, no� 2 (Spring 2010), pp� 13–34�
 66� William J� Toti [Capt�, USN (Ret�)], “The 
Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW,” U�S� Naval 
Institute Proceedings 140/6/1,336 (June 2014)�
 67� Snyder, Deterrence and Defense.
 68� Schelling, Arms and Influence.
 69� James Stebbins, “Broaching the Ship: Re-
thinking Submarines as a Signaling Tool in 
Naval Diplomacy” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2015)�
 70� For an in-depth look at this strategy, see John 
Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s 
Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 
19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 
2004)�
 71� John Lehman and J� Randy Forbes, “What 
Navy’s New Maritime Strategy Should  
Say,” Breaking Defense, 11 March 2015, 
breakingdefense�com/� In this article, Lehman 
is referring to the 1982 maritime strategy—a 
classified briefing developed in 1982 with an 
unclassified annex for public consumption� 
This strategy was a forerunner to the unclas-
sified 1986 Maritime Strategy�
 72� See Linton Brooks, “Naval Power and Na-
tional Security: The Case for the Maritime 
Strategy,” International Security 11, no� 2 
(1986)�
 73� Press Association, “How Britain Averted a 
Falklands Invasion in 1977,” The Guardian, 31 
May 2005, www�theguardian�com/�
 74� Brent Ditzler, “Naval Diplomacy beneath the 
Waves: A Study of the Coercive Use of Sub-
marines” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 1989)�
 75� Ibid�
 76� Rakesh Krishnan Simha, “1971 War: How 
Russia Sank Nixon’s Gunboat Diplomacy,” 
Russia & India Report, 20 December 2011, 
www�rbth�com/�
 77� Paul Pryce, “The Republic of Korea Navy: 
Blue-Water Bound?,” Center for International 
Maritime Security, 28 January 2016, cimsec 
�org/�
 78� Richard Bitzinger, Arming Asia: Techno-
nationalism and Its Impact on Local Defense 
Industries (New York: Routledge, 2017)�
 79� Arthur Dominic J� Villasanta, “Another of 
South Korea’s Largest Warships Set to Launch 
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/6
 1 0 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
  in 2020,” Telegiz, 1 May 2017, www�telegiz 
�com/�
 80� Terence Roehrig, “South Korea’s Counter-
piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” in 
Global Korea: South Korea’s Contributions to 
International Security, ed� Scott Bruce et al� 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
2012)�
 81� Sukjoon Yoon, “Expanding the ROKN’s ASW 
Capabilities to Deal with North Korean SLBMs,” 
PacNet, no� 31 (28 May 2015)�
 82� U�S� State Dept�, “U�S� Relations with the Re-
public of Korea,” bilateral relations fact sheet, 
17 July 2018, available at www�state�gov/�
 83� “Joint Statement between the United States 
and Republic of Korea,” 30 June, 2017�
 84� U�S� Navy Dept�, A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, 
Ready (Washington, DC: March 2015)�
 85� For an excellent overview of this concept, see 
Ronald Ratcliff, “Building Partners’ Capacity: 
The Thousand-Ship Navy,” Naval War College 
Review 60, no� 4 (Autumn 2007), pp� 45–58�
 86� Bates Gill and Michael Green, “Unbundling 
Asia’s New Multilateralism,” in Asia’s New 
Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, 
and the Search for Community, ed� Bates Gill 
and Michael Green (New York: Columbia 
Univ� Press, 2009)�
 87� James R� Holmes, “Question: Just How Strong 
Was the Soviet Navy?,” Real Clear Defense, 6 
March 2015, www�realcleardefense�com/�
 88� Sanchez, “The Status of Brazil’s Ambitious 
PROSUB Program�” 
 89� Anthony Wells, A Tale of Two Navies: Geopoli-
tics, Technology, and Strategy in the United 
States Navy and Royal Navy, 1960–2015 (An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017)�
 90� John Simpson, “The Future of the Anglo-
US Nuclear Deterrence,” in Arms Control: 
Alliances, Arms Sales, and the Future, ed� Ken-
neth Thompson (Lanham, MD: Univ� Press of 
America, 1992)�
23
Yu and French: Should the United States Support a Republic of Korea Nuclear Subm
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
